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Abstract
The aviation infrastructure is broadly composed of aircraft, air traffic control systems,
airports and public airfields. Much attention has been given to physical security along
the years this industry has been expanding; and now, in the new age of interconnec-
tion devices, a growing concern about cybersecurity has risen.
The never-ending improvement of new digital technology has given birth to a new
generation of electronic-enabled (e-enabled) aircraft that implement a remarkable
amount of new technologies such as IP-enabled networks, COTS (commercial off-the-
shelf) components, wireless connectivity, and global positioning systems (GPSs). For
example, aircraft manufacturers are building wireless systems to reduce the amount
of wiring within an aircraft. The general purpose of this is the reduction in weight
that helps an aircraft achieve lower fuel consumption, but it can result into a security
issue since these wireless systems are vulnerable to cybersecurity threats.
Therefore, since the aviation infrastructure has taken advantages of the era of
technology and is providing unprecedented global connectivity, there is a need for an
in-depth study of the measures being taken to mitigate the security vulnerabilities
that these e-enabled aircraft technologies introduce that may have not been considered
in the traditional aircraft design.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Aviation security for information systems, or aviation cybersecurity, is a growing con-
cern from all parts of the industry. For a long time, aviation safety took the front
seat in all aspects of the aircraft life-cycle, because it was hard to conceive any cyber-
threat happening. Now, the tables have turned, and aviation cybersecurity has been
awarded a critical place in airworthiness.
In 2016, the United States Government proposed a bill “Cybersecurity Standards
for Aircraft to Improve Resilience Act of 2016” (United States, 2016):
To require the disclosure of information relating to cyber attacks on aircraft sys-
tems and maintenance and ground support systems for aircraft, to identify and address
cybersecurity vulnerabilities to the United States commercial aviation system, and for
other purposes.
The bill urged the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to disclose any at-
tempted or successful cyber attack on any system on board an aircraft, whether the
system was safety-critical or not. It also announced the prescription of regulations to
incorporate requirements relating to cybersecurity into the requirements for obtain-
ing an air carrier operating certificate or production certificate. These requirements
focused on having reasonable measures to protect against cyber attacks, periodic eval-
uations on these measures and updating them if necessary.
The U.S. National Airspace System (NAS), which is governed by the FAA, consist
of a ground-based air traffic control system that directs aircraft traffic on the ground
and in the air. And, while NAS already has a mature cybersecurity program in place,
there is a need for a specific framework that allows certification of compliance and
for aviation safety and security airworthiness. The framework needs to address safety
and security from the early stages of the aircraft life-cycle to be able to consider the
newly included elements in modern aircraft properly: electronic control systems and
software (e.g., those used to operate airlines, entertain passengers, and control sys-
tems associated with airline information systems).
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1.1 Statement of The Problem
The modern aircraft has a different design than it did when it was first imagined, and
it has become an extraordinary complex integrated system of systems.
In addition, as definitions are getting broader and modern systems are getting
more sophisticated, their modeling is also gaining complexity. It seems logical that
safety-critical systems such as aircraft must be analyzed from these new perspectives
that include safety and security altogether, since aircraft are now considered to be
’flying computers’ that are susceptible to safety-critical issues as they are susceptible
to cybersecurity threats.
There is also the ongoing aviation paradigm of globalization: aircraft systems move
from one country to another and have to comply with regulations from their countries
of origin, destination and all countries that they fly over. Therefore, not only aircraft
must be analyzed from a safety and security perspective, that analysis also needs to
prove compliance with all possible regulations.
The Problem Questions this thesis addresses are:
1. Do safety and security have to be approached separately, or can they be tackled
together, especially when it comes to software-intensive systems such as aviation
systems?
2. Which are the standards that information security for aviation systems has to
adhere to for compliance?
3. How does the process of standardization and compliance work? How can a
framework that complies with the standard be created?
4. Which methodologies are optimal for security engineering for aviation systems?
Can they merge with trusted safety engineering methodologies for aviation sys-
tems?
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
The development of an aircraft and its systems is very complex. It follows the Systems
Engineering process during its life-cycle. In (SAE-Aerospace, 2010), the conceptual
aircraft/systems development process is explained 2.1:
Figure 2.1: Aircraft or System Development Process Model (SAE-Aerospace, 2010)
In the standard, a generic approach is overviewed for developing aircraft and air-
craft systems from conceptual definition to certification. The development life cycle
has a beginning and an end, and can be re-entered to address aircraft or system
changes.
And now the aircraft design and development has increased in complexity, due to
the fact that the aircraft is interconnected: aircraft has network connectivity, and all
of its subsystems are controlled by aviation electronic control systems and software.
This leaves room for safety hazards and security vulnerabilities that could eliminate
the airworthiness of an aircraft, in other works, make the aircraft unsuitable for flight
operations. Therefore, a general overview of the new features (networks and connec-
tivity) of the modern aircraft is needed:
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Networks and Connectivity. In the design of the new generation of aircraft,
there are new network connections to be considered: control systems associated with
airline information services, passenger information and entertainment services.
There are several connections that are provided by different internet service providers:
• Air-Ground Datalink Service (e.g. ACARS): uses Air Traffic Service providers
and Airline Approved third party providers.
• Airport Network (e.g. GateLink): uses the Airline-Approved third party providers.
• Air-Ground Broadband Network (e.g.INMARSAT): uses Airline-Approved third
party providers and Passanger-Accessed third party providers.
And there are several connections that allow for aircraft information interconnec-
tion:
• Control the Aircraft: it is in the Aircraft Control Domain. It uses VHF/H-
F/SatCom.
• Operate the Aircraft: it contains the Airline Info Services and the Passengers
Information and Entertainment Services Domain. It uses WirelessLAN and a
Broadband/Cellular network.
• Passenger Use: it is in the Passenger-Owned Devices Domained.
Figure 2.2: Aircraft Information Interconnections
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2.1.1 Safety and Security Engineering
Safety and Security Co-Engineering. Historically, safety and security are two
risk-driven activities that have been tackled separately; but, since new cybersecurity
attacks are appearing every day, it is getting more and more recognized worldwide
that both engineering specialties cannot continue to ignore each other.
In literature, (Paul and Rioux, 2015) provides a bibliography or research papers
on safety and security (cybersecurity) co-engineering dating back to the early 90s.
The author announces four common streams of research when it comes to the cross-
fertilization between safety engineering and security engineering.
• Treating issues related to safety engineering and security engineering
separately: The papers conclude that there is room for improvement for a
possible co-engineering scenario, but they do not offer any clarification on how
to achieve it. They might provide high-level recommendations on the directions
in which there should be investigation, but they do not present the actual
study. A peculiar conclusion is extracted from some papers that recall that
even though safe systems were not explicitly designed to be secure, they often
offer good properties against attacks.
• Improving security engineering by adapting safety engineering tech-
niques to security: Since safety engineering is recognized as a more mature
engineering specialty than security engineering, multiple papers present adap-
tations of safety engineering techniques into the security domain.
• Extend the scope of safety engineering by adapting cybersecurity
techniques: The opposite of the previous research current, the papers push
for adapting the overall good practices of cybersecurity to safety engineering.
• Clean slate approach for co-engineering: Not adapting any kind of tech-
nique from one discipline to the other, but starting to build new techniques that
involve both of the disciplines.
(ITEA2, 2016) gives an overview of the instances in which safety and security
co-engineering have resulted into positive results or prominent research in aviation
systems, concluding that both disciplines -when adequately combined- can offer bet-
ter results than when they are applied separately.
(Garcia et al., 2018) states that safety engineering cannot be understood as a
standalone discipline that does not integrate nor correlate with security engineering,
especially in safety-critical systems. As the systems elements keep increasing in com-
plexity and offering more capabilities by becoming part of the Internet of Things,
cybersecurity has to be a part of it since its conception and design.
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Safety Assessment Process. (Balakrishnan, 2015) The safety assessment pro-
cess is defined as a methodology to evaluate aircraft functions and the design of sys-
tems performing these functions to determine that the associated hazards for those
functions have been properly addressed (Wang, 2017).
According to SAE ARP4761 (SAE-Aerospace, 1996), the safety assessment process
in aviation includes other processes:
• Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA): should be carried out at both the aircraft
and system levels. The goal in conducting this step is to clearly identify the
circumstances and severity of each Failure Condition along with the rationale
for its classification.
Aircraft FHA and System FHA refer to a systematic and comprehensive ex-
amination of aircraft or system functions to identify and classify the potential
functional failure conditions according to the severity. The FHA is updated (a
living document) throughout the development cycle.
• Preliminary Aircraft / System Safety Assessment (PASA/PSSA): it is a system-
atic evaluation of a proposed system architecture and implementation based on
the Functional Hazard Assessment and failure condition classification to deter-
mine safety requirements for all items.
The PASA and PSSA is also a comprehensive examination of a proposed aircraft
or system architecture to determine how failures can lead to the aircraft or sys-
tem level failure conditions. In the PASA and PSSA requirements for the lower
levels are established, and the PASA and PSSA are also updated throughout
the development process.
• Aircraft / System Safety Assessment (ASA / SSA): A systematic, comprehen-
sive evaluation of the implemented system to show that the relevant require-
ments are met. It shows that safety objectives from the Aircraft or System FHA
and relevant requirements established by the PASA and PSSA are satisfied.
Security Assessment Process for Aviation Systems. The security assess-
ment process is defined as a methodology to evaluate systems’ design and system
functions to discover the threats that these have associated and determine that they
have been mitigated. The same way the safety assessment process had several pro-
cesses to analyze and evaluate hazards, the security assessment process has several
techniques to analyze and evaluate threats.
For the security assessment process, different methodologies are used: threat mod-
eling and risk modeling techniques, which involve identifying, quantifying and ad-
dressing security risks that are associated with the system, in this case, the aircraft
and all of its systems and items.
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 5
2.2 Certification and Standards
Regulatory Framework and Air Law. As (Kolle et al., 2015) explains, there is
one problem with regulation and legislation when it comes to air law. A plane can
leave the United States, with cargo from Brazil, heading to the European Union, and
it has to comply with all regulation and laws (both international and local). This
presents a paradigm of regulation and standardization that was not considered when
the aircraft was first designed for commercial flight.
A conference for the formulation of international air law was held in Paris in 1900.
However, international air travel only became a reality after World War I (1914 –
1918). The legal framework for international civil aviation first appears in October
1919. Twenty-six participants of the Paris Peace Conference signed the Convention
for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation (Paris Convention). The Paris Convention
coined the principle that every state has the absolute and exclusive sovereignty over
the airspace above its territory. Later, fifty-four nations met in Chicago from Novem-
ber to December 1944 to “make arrangements for the establishment of world air routes
and associated services” and “to set up an interim council to collect, record, and study
data concerning international aviation with the aim to make recommendations for its
improvement”. The Conference was also invited to “discuss the principles and meth-
ods to be followed in the adoption of a new aviation convention”. It also led to the
creation of the agency of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). In
1947, ICAO became a United Nations specialized agency, even though it remained
an independent and autonomous agency.
Three of the most relevant articles of the Chicago Convention, article 31 (Certifi-
cates of Airworthiness), article 32 (Licenses of personnel) and article 33 (Recognition
of Certificates and Licenses) provide a collection of rules that allow for aircraft cer-
tification of airworthiness to be issued, provided by single states and also allow for
those same certifications to be recognized by other states, as long as the requirements
under which they have been issued are equal or above the minimum standards which
may be established by ICAO. Therefore, a framework of regulatory oversight between
states, operators, services providers and maintenance organizations was created. The
relationships are shown in the following table 2.1.
The aforementioned regulatory legislative framework needs to make a clear dis-
tinction: the difference between a regulation and a standard. To answer this (ibid.),
(Abeyratne, 2010), the concept of ‘hard law’ and ‘soft law’ of aviation need to be ad-
dressed. In aviation law, administrative law and decisions can have different names
and come from different fields, and those are broken down into technical specifica-
tions, acceptable means of compliance and guidance material. Hard law is those
regulations by authorities and government, which are legally binding in nature. Soft
law refers to the non-legally binding nature of technical specifications and guidance
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Table 2.1: Regulatory Framework.
Regulatory Legislative Framework Actor Action
International Conventions and Aviation Law Government Oversight
National Law
Regional Rules and Government Oversight
Law Authorities
National Regulation
Regional Regulation Authorities Establish Rules and
Requirements
National Law Service Providers Compliance
Manufacturers
material. Even though they are not legally binding, they provide standardization and
implementation of rules and requirements stipulated by regulations. In a way, ‘soft
law’ is a detailed version of the simple and brief rules that make ‘hard law’.
Figure 2.2 shows the entities that are in charge of managing the different docu-
ments (e.g. regulations, specifications, standards) of aviation law:
Table 2.2: Hard law and soft law entities.
Law Documents Entity
Hard Law International Convention / Law ICAO
Hard Law Regulation, Implementation Rules FAA - EASA
Hard Law / Standards EUROCAE - RTCA
Soft Law Technical Specification ARINC
Soft Law Acceptable Means of Compliance FAA - EASA
Soft Law Guidance Materials EUROCAE - RTCA
Cybersecurity Regulations. (Abeyratne, 2010) The Aviation Security Panel of
ICAO met at its Twentieth Meeting in Montreal from 30 March to 3 April 2009. The
Panel noted that significant progress in efforts to proactively identify vulnerabilities
and potential gaps in existing measures had been made, but it was not enough: An-
nex 17 (Aviation Security) of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago
Convention) was lacking in provisions for cyber-attacks. It was stablished that the
threat of cyber-attacks was significant, and redacted a proposal to include a Recom-
mended Practice in Annex 17 to ensure that information and communication tech-
nology systems used for civil aviation purposes would be protected from cyber attacks.
Standarization. (Pearson and Riley, 2015) The FAA is authorized to make rules
regarding aviation. The agency’s rule-making procedures are found in 14 CFR Part
11. The FAA’s rule-making activities encompass all of the agency’s areas of respon-
sibility, including air traffic control, aviation security, etc.
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Figure 2.3 is a graphic representation of the process that the FAA follows when
making significant rules.
Figure 2.3: FAA Rule-making. (Pearson and Riley, 2015)
Regulations. The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) is the codification, compi-
lation and classification of the general and permanent rules and regulations published
in the Federal Register by the executive departments and agencies of the Federal Gov-
ernment of the United States. In aviation airworthiness, 14 CFR, Advisory Circulars
(AC) and Airworthiness Directives (AD) are the most relevant regulations that to be
considered.
• 14 CFR. The Federal Aviation Regulations are found in Title 14 of the Code
of Federal Regulations (14 CFR). Since 1958, these rules have typically been
referred to as “FARs,” short for Federal Aviation Regulations.
• Advisory Circulars. The FAA issues Advisory Circulars (ACs) to inform the
aviation public in a systematic way of non-regulatory material. Unless incorpo-
rated into a regulation by reference, the contents of an advisory circular are not
binding on the public. For example, (CAAS, 2017), (AIRCRAFT NETWORK
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SECURITY PROGRAMME (ANSP)) and (Civil Aviation Safety Authority,
2016) (AC 20-01 Software configuration management).
• Airworthiness Directives. In accordance with Part 39 of Title 14 of the
Code of Federal Regulations, the FAA issues Airworthiness Directives (ADs)
in response to deficiencies and/or unsafe conditions found in aircraft, engines,
propellers, or other aircraft parts. ADs require that the relevant problem must
be corrected on all aircraft or aircraft parts using the same design.
Certification and Accreditation. The process of certification for Information
Security, in aviation industry or any other industry that requires rigorous certification
and accreditation. In order to understand C&A, it is important to distinguish between
certification and accreditation.
• Certification: is the technical evaluation of the security components and their
compliance for the purpose of accreditation.
• Accreditation: is the formal acceptance of the adequacy of the system’s overall
security by the management.
In (InfoSec, 2003) it is announced that going through the formal process of Certifi-
cation and Accreditation (C&A) insures that a clearly established set of Security Re-
quirements is developed and implemented, any residual risk is minimized and clearly
understood, and all aspects of the development and deployment of security controls
and policies are described in the System Authority Authorization Agreement (SSAA).
The C&A process is defined by using a four phase approach: definition, verifica-
tion, validation, and post accreditation. Their tasks are:
1. A list of guidance documents is compiled from all applicable directives and
policy guidelines to define the rules that the C&A process will follow, and to
help define a set of Security Requirements for the system.
2. Persons and organizations are chosen to fill the roles defined by the C&A guid-
ance documents
3. The scope of the system being certified is determined.
4. A list of Security Requirements that are relevant to the system are created based
on the chosen guidance documents.
5. A System Security Authorization Agreement (SSAA) document is created con-
taining all of the relevant information about the system.
6. A set of test procedures are developed from the security requirements.
7. A System Test and Evaluation (ST&E) is performed by the certifiers, and a
report of the relevant findings is generated.
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8. Once all of the security findings are sufficiently addressed and verified, a Risk
Assessment is performed to describe the severity of the residual risk.
9. A recommendation is made by the Certifiers to the Designated Approving Au-
thority (DAA).
10. The system is either accredited, granted an Interim Authority to Operate, or
denied accreditation by the DAA.
In Aviation Systems, according to the guide (AIA et al., 2017), there have been
significant changes in the certification processes over the last 10-15 years to improve
the efficiency and effectiveness of the certification and design approval processes to
enhance product safety.
The guide allows an applicant to: (1) lay out the information in such a way that
an Applicant can understand the basic expectations and best practices for achieving
a successful product approval process (2) provide experienced Applicants with guid-
ance on how to move along the path toward a more systematic and mature process
for product certification or approval (3) provide all stakeholders, including FAA staff,
with the knowledge of how to maximize the potential of the existing processes in con-
ducting efficient certification processes while maintaining the systems’ health through
risk based oversight through the use of the tools in this Guide.
Standards. According to (Kaiser, 2013) there are a several cybersecurity stan-
dards that are currently in place and others that are being developed to provide
guidelines:
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Organization Title Summary Status
FAA Information Security
Certification and Ac-
creditation (C&A)
Handbook
The primary source of procedures and guidance
that supports the C&A process in protecting the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of FAA’s
information that is collected, processed, transmit-
ted, stored, or disseminated in its general support
systems, major applications, ICSs, and other ap-
plications.
Published
RTCA Airworthiness Security
Methods and Consid-
erations
This document is a resource for certification au-
thorities and the aviation industry for developing
or modifying aircraft systems and equipment when
there is the possibility of danger to flight from voli-
tional human action involving information or infor-
mation system interfaces. It presents permissible
methodologies to meet the data requirements and
compliance objectives of an airworthiness security
process.
Published
RTCA Airworthiness Security
Process Specification
The first of a series of documents on aeronau-
tical systems security that together will address
information security for the overall Aeronautical
Information System Security (AISS) of airborne
systems with related ground systems and environ-
ment. This document addresses only aircraft type
certification and is not yet widely implemented,
but is derived from understood best practices.
Published
AEEC Guidelines for the In-
corporation of Cyber
Security in the Devel-
opment of AEEC Doc-
uments
This Technical Application Bulletin represents the
2009-current cyber security thinking and experi-
ence useful in the development of further AEEC
specifications. The intent is to periodically update
the cyber security guidelines and disseminate them
to AEEC Subcommittees as conditions warrant.
Review
ARINC ARINC 811: Commer-
cial Aircraft Informa-
tion Security Concepts
of Operation and Pro-
cess Framework
The purpose of this document is to facilitate an un-
derstanding of aircraft information security and to
develop aircraft information security operational
concepts. This document also provides an aircraft
information security process framework relating to
airline operational needs that, when implemented
by an airline and its suppliers, will enable the safe
and secure dispatch of the aircraft in a timely
manner. This framework facilitates development
of cost-effective aircraft information security and
provides a common language for understanding se-
curity needs.
Published
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 11
Comprehensive list of all authorities and the standards and guidelines that are
referred when it comes to Information Security in Aviation Systems:
• AIAA: (AIAA, 2013) presents a Framework for Aviation Cybersecurity. It
highlightens the need for a cybersecurity framework for aviation. The first
steps to achieve it are:
1. Establish common cyber standards for aviation systems.
2. Establish a cybersecurity culture.
3. Understand the threat.
• (AEEC) ARINC: In (Infrastructure and WG, 2012) a list of all ARINC Stan-
dards that are used to support the design and development of aircraft systems,
avionics, networks and information security are listed and explained. It argues
that the more consistently all elements work together over the aircraft life-cycle,
the better. Its main security process (that offers an overview of aircraft secu-
rity and the proper security considerations) is provided by ARINC Report 811
(Olive et al., 2007).
• NIST: For risk management, (Barrett et al., 2017) proposes a following the
National Institute of Standards and Technology Institute Special Publication
800-x Series. NIST is responsible for developing standards and guidelines – in-
cluding minimum requirements – to provide adequate information security for
federal information and information systems. This suite of security and privacy
risk management standards and guidelines provides guidance for an integrated,
organization-wide program to manage information security risk. (NHTSA,
2014) and (NIST, 2017) have presented an Information Security Framework
that works for automotives systems.
• FAA: (Administration, 2006) presents a public guideline for the Certification
and Accreditation of all information systems owned or managed by the federal
government. This Handbook describes the process that all FAA organizations
must follow to conduct C&A. This handbook is required by FAA Order 1370.82,
as amended, for the implementation of the FAA’s Information Systems Security
Program defined in that order.
• RTCA: A list of all the RTCA standard documents published to date can be
seen in (RTCA, 2016). RTCA, Inc. is a not-for-profit corporation formed to
advance the art and science of aviation and aviation electronic systems for the
benefit of the public. The organization functions as a Federal advisory commit-
tee and develops consensus-based recommendations on contemporary aviation
issues.
RTCA’s goals include (1) combine aviation system user and provider technical
requirements, knowledge and practices in a manner that helps government and
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industry meet their mutual objectives and responsibilities (2) analyzing and rec-
ommending solutions to system technical issues (3) development of consensus
on the application of pertinent technology to fulfill user and provider require-
ments and (4) assisting in developing the appropriate technical material upon
which positions for the International Civil Aviation Organization.
RTCA has a set of standards (known as DO-326A set) for Security Airworthi-
ness:
1. DO-326A: (RTCA DO-326A, 2014), previously (RTCA DO-326, 2010),
states that the document:
[...] is a resource for Airworthiness Authorities (AA) and the aviation
industry for certification when the development or modification of aircraft
systems and the effects of intentional unauthorized electronic interaction
can affect aircraft safety. It deals with the activities that need to be per-
formed in support of the airworthiness process when it comes to the threat
of intentional unauthorized electronic interaction [...]
[...] adds to current guidance for aircraft certification to handle the threat
of intentional unauthorized electronic interaction to aircraft safety. It adds
data requirements and compliance objectives, as organized by generic ac-
tivities for aircraft development and certification, to handle the threat of
unauthorized interaction to aircraft safety and is intended to be used in
conjunction with other applicable guidance material, including SAE ARP
4754A, DO-178C, and DO-254.
2. DO-356A: (RTCA DO-356A, 2017), previously (RTCA DO-356, 2014),
is a companion document of DO-326A that proposes methodologies to
achieve the objectives and certification of Security Airworthiness. The
document states:
[...] provides a set of methods and guidelines that may be used within the
airworthiness security process defined in ED-202A / DO-326A. It is rec-
ognized that alternative methods to the processes described or references in
this document may be available to an organization desiring to obtain cer-
tification.
3. DO-355: (RTCA DO-355, 2014) is a companion document of the DO-
326A set that provides guidelines for aviation airworthiness once the air-
craft has already been developed and is in service ongoing. It states:
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[...] s a resource for civil aviation authorities and the aviation industry
when the operation and maintenance of aircraft and the effects of informa-
tion security threats can affect aircraft safety. It deals with the activities
that need to be performed in operation and maintenance of the aircraft re-
lated to information security threats. This document gives also guidance
that is related to operational and commercial effects (i.e. guidance that
exceeds the safety-only effects).[...]
[...] addresses information security risks only. The security measures to
mitigate these risks are not limited to information technology; they may
also be physical or organizational. Apart from the classical Instructions for
Continued Airworthiness that are directly related to aircraft parts and sys-
tems, this document also provides guidance on Ground Support Equipment
and Ground Support Information Systems that are related to the security
of aircraft information systems and data networks.
Since it is hypothesized that security and safety should go hand-in-hand, an
overview of safety standards that are adaptable to security standards (RTCA stan-
dards and guidelines) is provided in Figure 2.4. The RTCA has released DO-178C and
DO-278A as certification guidance for the production of airborne and ground-based
air traffic management software, respectively. Additionally, RTCA has also produced
at the same time, five other companion documents. These documents are RTCA
DO-248C, DO-330, DO-331, DO-332, and DO-333. These supplements address issues
about software certification, provide guidance on tool qualification requirements, and
illustrate the modifications recommended to DO-178C when using model-based soft-
ware design, object oriented programming, and formal methods.
Figure 2.4: 178C set and its supplementary documents.
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• DO-178C: (RTCA DO-178C, 2011) provides the aviation community with
guidance for determining, in a consistent manner and with an acceptable level of
confidence, that the software aspects of airborne systems and equipment comply
with airworthiness requirements.
• DO-330: (RTCA DO-330, 2011) provides tool qualification guidance. It was
developed to provide tool-specific guidance for developers of software and tool
users, and provides examples of guidance for DO-178C and DO-278A.
• DO-333: (RTCA DO-333, 2011) provides guidance for the adoption of For-
mal Methods into an established set of processes for development and verifi-
cation. The extent to which formal methods are used to satisfy the objectives
of DO-178C can vary according to aspects such as preferences of the program
management or choice of techniques specified in the document.
• DO-254: (RTCA DO-254, 2000) provides guidance for design assurance of
airborne electronic hardware from conception through initial certification and
subsequent post certification product improvements to ensure continued airwor-
thiness.
As it is seen, there are different aspects that play a role into standardization:
which authority and/or agency is publicizing the standard/guidelines and how they
build a framework for information security for aviation or security airworthiness.
Aircraft Systems Development. There are also technical reports, standards
and guidelines that are followed to develop the entirety of the aircraft systems. Those
standards/recommendations are combined with the previously mentioned security
standards and guidelines (RTCA DO-326A set) to achieve security airworthiness in
the aircraft life-cycle.
• SAE ARP4754A: (SAE-Aerospace, 2010) document states:
[...]discusses the development of aircraft systems taking into account the overall
aircraft operating environment and functions. This includes validation of re-
quirements and verification of the design implementation for certification and
product assurance.
[...] It provides practices for showing compliance with the regulations and serves
to assist a company in developing and meeting its own internal standards by
considering the guidelines herein. This document addresses the development
cycle for aircraft and systems that implement aircraft functions [...].
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• SAE ARP4761A: (SAE-Aerospace, 1996) document states:
[...] describes guidelines and methods of performing the safety assessment for
certification of civil aircraft. The methods outlined here identify a systematic
means, but not the only means, to show compliance.[...]
[...] presents guidelines for conducting an industry accepted safety assessment
consisting of Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA), Preliminary System Safety
Assessment (PSSA), and System Safety Assessment (SSA). This document also
presents information on the safety analysis methods needed to conduct the safety
assessment. These methods include the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Depen-
dence Diagram (DD), Markov Analysis (MA), Failure Modes and Effect Analy-
sis (FMEA), Failure Modes and Effects Summary (FMES) and Common Cause
Analysis (CCA). [CCA is composed of Zonal Safety Analysis (ZSA), Particular
Risks Analysis (PRA), and Common Mode Analysis (CMA). [...]
• SAE ARP5150A: (SAE-Aerospace, 2013a) document states:
[...] describes guidelines, methods, and tools used to perform the ongoing safety
assessment process for transport airplanes in commercial service (hereafter,
termed “airplane”). The process described herein is intended to support an
overall safety management program. It is associated with showing compliance
with the regulations, and also with assuring a company that it meets its own
internal standards.[...]
[...] provides a systematic process to measure and monitor safety to help de-
termine safety priorities and focus available resources in areas that offer the
greatest potential to improve aviation safety. [...].
• SAE ARP5151: (SAE-Aerospace, 2013b) document states:
[...] provides a systematic process for assessing ongoing safety of General Avi-
ation airplanes and Rotorcraft (GAR). This process is intended to assist in
focusing available resources in areas that maximize the potential to improve
commercial aviation safety.[...]
[...] To improve safety during the complete aircraft life cycle, it is not sufficient
to assess the safety of the aircraft only during its design phase. Ongoing air-
craft operations should be evaluated for safety (e.g., maintenance or operation
procedures) [...]
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 16
2.3 Security Assessment
Methodologies and Techniques. As mentioned in the beginning of the chapter,
there is a research current that tries to apply well-known safety engineering tech-
niques to security engineering.
It seems to be a common pattern for safety/security approaches to introduce the
concept of Tree Analysis. For safety assessment, Fault Tree Analysis is most common,
and specified in SAE ARP4761. For security assessment, there are Attack Trees and
Threat Trees.
Fault Tree Analysis was developed to represent possible ways a system could fail
as a result of component or subsystem failures. It uses Boolean logic operations to
represent how such failures are interrelated, and how they could result in failure. They
are represented as networks of Boolean logic operators where a fault is considered to
either have occurred or not occurred. Attack Trees or Threat trees are similar to fault
trees but focus only on the security of a system and are an enumeration of possible
attacks. The root of an attack tree represents a successful attack and the leaf nodes
represent ways of achieving the planned attack. Like fault trees, attack trees also rely
on binary-valued algebras (Ongsakorn et al., 2010).
In (Kornecki and Liu, 2013), a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) for Safety/Security
verification in Aviation Software is presented. It aims to go from Hazards and Threat
to the requirements specification. It argues that, since the requirements are most
probably the element that makes a project succeed or fail (in terms of development),
it will find requirements using a well-known technique (Fault Tree Analysis). To
test its theory, it applies FTA to the analysis of a component of NextGen simulation
(ASN Gateway); building the appropriate FTA models to develop safety/security re-
quirements. The paper’s main contribution is to show how application of the FTA
technique leads to identification of safety and security requirements of the gateway
and, subsequently, proposing appropriate mitigation. Its chosen measurable and re-
peatable scientific elements applicable to assuring the security of software systems
included: threats, vulnerabilities, security violations, attack integrity confidentiality,
among others.
(Ongsakorn et al., 2010) introduces a new type of tree: Cyber Threat Trees. They
are a superset of Fault and Attack trees since they are based on multiple-valued or
radix-p valued algebras over a finite and discrete set of values. For example, when
the radix p=2, the cyber threat tree reduces to a fault or attack tree depending on
the nature of the disruptive events. It explains that cyber threat trees have usually
p¿2 to allow for allow for more complicated interactions to be modeled.
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In addition to Attack Trees to model threat scenarios, there are also Attack-
Defense Tress (ADT), as presented in (Aslanyan and Nielson, 2015). An ADT de-
scribes the interaction between an attacker and a defender, and is evaluated by as-
signing parameters to the nodes, such as probability or cost of attacks and defences.
Attack-Defence Trees are a useful tool to study attack-defence scenarios and present
the interaction between an attacker and a defender in an intuitive way. It argues that
in cases of multiple parameters, most analytic methods optimize one parameter at
a time, (for example, minimize cost or maximize probability of an attack); and that
leads to sub-optimal solutions when the two parameters that have to be optimized are
conflicting parameters. The paper presents evaluation techniques for multi-paramter
ADT that optimize all parameters at once.
Fault Tree Analysis is not the only safety assessment methodology that is analo-
gously implemented in security assessment. In (Schmittner et al., 2014), the security
adapted version of Failure Mode and Effect Analysis is proposed: Failure Mode, Vul-
nerabilities and Effects Analysis (FMVEA). The Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
(FMEA) is a structured technique which investigates failure modes and their effects.
The aim is to identify potential weaknesses and improve reliability, availability or
safety. A system or process is hierarchically decomposed into its basic elements and
then the failure modes of the elements are examined for causes and effects.
(a) FMEA (Schmittner et al., 2014). (b) FMVEA (Schmittner et al., 2014).
Figure 2.5: Comparison between the two methodologies.
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The process to achieve FMEA is described in Figure 2.5a, whereas in Figure 2.5b
the process has been a adapted to include security in the analysis (FMVEA). As it
has been stated throughout this chapter, there are different ways in which security
and safety properties of a system can influence one another. Therefore, while the
consideration of failure or threat modes of an item is split, the analysis of effects and
causes combines both viewpoints.
Another technique used in safety that is applied in security appears in (Jimenez
et al., 2017). It consists in the generation of checklists for standards; arguing it can
be considered as a ”best practice” which provides a set of notes and conclusions to the
reviewer (in the end these items will serve to detect and fix defects). Nowadays, most
companies have checklists applicable to its specific development methodology but not
focused on this any type of standards. Depending on the standard, the complexity
of the checklist can increase exponentially, that is why it proposed a set of checklists
for the newest revision of RTCA DO-178C and DO-278A.
Threat Modeling. Threat modeling is an activity for creating an abstrac-
tion of a software system—aimed at identifying attackers’ abilities, motivations, and
goals—and using it to generate and catalog possible threats. As defined in (Shostack,
2014), there are very important reasons to threat model in the design phase:
• Find Security Bugs Early: Threat modeling can help you find design issues even
before software has been developed or implemented.
• Understand Security Requirements: As threats are found and there is an assess-
ment of how they are going to be mitigated, requirements become more clear.
With more clear requirements, a consistent set of security features and proper-
ties can be build. In threat modeling, there is an important interplay between
requirements, threats, and mitigations.
• Engineer and Deliver Better Products: When requirements and design are con-
sidered along with threats, there is a significant lower probability of having to
re-design due to security bugs.
• Address Issues Other Techniques Will Not: Threat modeling can lead you to
categories of issues that other tools will not find, e.g. errors of omission, failure
to authenticate a connection. That’s not something that a code analysis tool is
going to determine.
In (Shull, 2016), Carnegie Mellon University prepared a comparison and evalua-
tion of threat modeling methodologies: STRIDE, Security Cards and Personan non
Grata (PnG). The most common is STRIDE, even though the evaluation does not
conclude is the best threat modeling methodology.
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STRIDE The STRIDE model was developed by Microsoft STRIDE n.d. as a
threat risk modeling technique. The STRIDE model considers the effect of each
threat type and assumes the cause of each threat will be uncovered during analysis
activities. It is the responsibility of the individuals performing threat modeling and
analysis to discover and describe the cause and effect of threats and attack vectors,
which requires the unique context of a system under analysis. When STRIDE is
applied to an application, one should consider how each of the threats in the model
affects each component and each of its connections or relationships with other appli-
cation components. STRIDE is composed by S, T, R, I, D, and E threat categories,
which stand for:
• Spoofing Identity.
• Tampering with data.
• Repudiation.
• Information disclosure.
• Denial of service.
• Elevation of privilege.
DREAD. DREAD is another threat risk model that can complement the prelim-
inary analysis in STRIDE, that was used previously in Microsoft. DREAD is a model
also based on categorizing threats as D, R, E, A and D, but they are analyzed from
a different point of view. These dimensions help determine what the impact of these
security threat really mean. DREAD modeling influences the thinking behind setting
the risk rating and can be used directly to categorize the risks. The DREAD algo-
rithm (3.1) is used to compute a risk value, which is an average of all five categories
OWASP n.d.
• Damage potential.
• Reproducibility.
• Exploitability.
• Affected users.
• Discoverability.
There is not a consensus on how the actual risk point scale should be, since it all
depends on the individuals performing the thread modeling. It is recommended to
not have a large scale (e.g. from 0 to 10). For example, a simple scheme would be:
High (10 points), Medium (5 points), and Low (0 points) when it comes to Damage
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potential, and Hard (0 points), Medium (5 points), Easy (0 points) when it comes to
Reproducibility. After, all points are computed and result into a risk value:
RiskDREAD =
D + R + E + A + D
5
(2.1)
Trustworthiness. Trustworthiness by definition used to interchangeable with
dependability, before the complexity of interconnected systems increased drastically.
While this is nowadays still accurate, the definition of trustworthiness has expanded
to include privacy and cybersecurity when applicable. Dependability, which in its
turn includes safety, reliability, availability and security, has also evolved since the
introduction of information systems embedded into everyday objects (Garcia et al.,
2018).
Therefore, trustworthiness is now also an implicit requirement of the Security
Assessement. In (R. F. Babiceanu and R. Seker, 2017) and (Radu F. Babiceanu and
Remzi Seker, 2017), different trustworthiness frameworks are developed to enhance
the establishment of the requirements in cyber-physical systems and small Unmanned
Aerial Systems.
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Chapter 3
Discussion
Aviation systems are complex systems. They are usually broken down to simpler
sub-systems which perform the same task, for example, ’Communication’. Almost
all aviation systems are tied to one or more avionics functions, which increase their
complexity and cost.
That is why their design, development, testing, verification and certification has
become also increasingly more complicated. But, no matter how complex aviation
systems are, their main purpose is to ensure airworthiness of the aircraft.
Airworthiness is the measure of an aircraft’s suitability for safe flight, as defined
in (RTCA DO-326A, 2014).
It is the measure in which the aircraft service is attested to throughout its own life-
cycle: (1) aircraft operators use Airworthiness as the principal certification instrument
(2) aircraft manufacturers have to prove through a stage-based approach that the de-
sign and development of the aircraft have resulted in an aircraft that can be safely
operated (3) airline operators have to ensure continued airworthiness through the
establishment of processes for operations and maintenance.
Therefore, if a framework were to be implemented to assure airworthiness in avi-
ation systems, which standards, guidelines, regulations should it comply with?
Furthermore, it has been established that in the current networked aviation paradigm
an aircraft’s suitability for a safe flight does not only include safety engineering, but
security engineering as well. There is a need for both disciplines to be applied in the
aircraft life-cycle; but can the safety assurance process for Airworthiness be done in
coordination with the security assessment process?
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3.1 Standards and Certification
To be able to develop and implement a framework for information security for aviation
systems, the current security standards had to be analyzed. As seen in the previous
chapter, there are a significant number of security standards that one could choose
from to start building a security framework. But, depending on which standards are
chosen, how do we make sure they guarantee airworthiness?
3.1.1 Standard
Standards arise from Aviation’s ”hard law”, and are meant to be compliant with (1)
international conventions (2) international laws and (3) regulations and implementa-
tion rules.
For airworthiness, the following regulatory framework is applied 3.1:
Figure 3.1: Framework for Aviation Airworthiness (United States)
Industry standards are defined and accepted as the minimum requirements in or-
der to comply with an industry code of practices or regulations; therefore, standards
are a means of regulatory compliance. In other words, operators and service providers
that are being trusted to comply with regulation and legislation will not procure sys-
tems do not adhere or that are not produced according to a minimum set of practices
and demonstrate required performance.
For the purpose of the framework design, the RTCA Security Process Airworthi-
ness Standards are chosen. They define Airworthiness security as:
[...] Airworthiness security is the protection of the airworthiness of an aircraft
from intentional unauthorized electronic interaction. Existing safety processes have
not had to consider intentional disruption. Intentional unauthorized electronic in-
teraction (also known as ”unauthorized interaction”) is defined as human-initiated
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actions with the potential to affect the aircraft due to unauthorized access, use, dis-
closure, denial, disruption, modification, or destruction of electronic information or
electronic aircraft system interfaces. This definition includes the effects of malware
on infected devices and the logical effects of external systems on aircraft systems, but
does not include physical attacks or electromagnetic jamming.
In 2010, RTCA developed the Airworthiness Security Process Specification (RTCA
DO-326, 2010), a first document intended to increase current guidance for aircraft cer-
tification to handle the information security threats to aircraft safety. The document
established compliance objectives and data requirements paralleled with the expected
activities for aircraft development and certification. The document was later updated
(Airworthiness Security Process Specification, RTCA DO-326A, 2014), and currently
offeres guidance for aircraft certification to handle threats of intentional unautho-
rized electronic interaction to aircraft safety. At the same time, RTCA developed
another document, the Information Security Guidance for Continuing Airworthiness
(RTCA DO-355, 2014), which addresses concerns regarding continuing airworthiness
and development. The document became a resourceful guideline for the operation and
maintenance of an aircraft, and the actions that need to be taken during those stages
related to information security threats. It also acknowledges the effects of information
security threats that could affect aircraft safety. Another document, Airworthiness
Security Methods and Considerations (RTCA DO-356, 2014) provides guidance in the
areas of Security Risk Assessment and Analysis, and Effectiveness Assurance, which
were previously identified in RTCA DO-326, and presents methodologies for Security
Risk Analysis and Network Security Domains.
The primary goal of the RTCA DO-326A, DO-355 and DO-356A standards was to
provide a much-needed framework for Airworthiness Security that was also intended
to be part of the Systems Engineering and system life-cycle. This allows for a sense
of holistic security in airworthiness certification, which was not previously provided,
since most security standards that were previously published did not strive to achieve
a well-rounded framework to cover the complete spectrum of the system’s life-cycle,
and it can be mapped onto a system engineering perspective. This includes the certi-
fication of the assessment of the system for compliance with the appropriate aviation
rules. Airworthiness certificates are issued for aircraft that are built (designed and
assembled) according to accepted standards by a holder of a production certificate
for manufacturing and based on evidence (standard practices/methods, testing) of
compliance with a type certificate.
The RTCA DO-326A, DO-355 and DO-356A standards have a rather complex
relation with other existing standards, technical reports and regulations for aviation
security. Therefore, a relation framework overview is needed to understand the intri-
cacies of information security standards and documents 3.2:
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Figure 3.2: Relations between Security Standards in Airworthiness Engineering.
Standards integrated with the Systems Engineering approach:
• Development (RTCA DO-326A - Airworthiness Security Process
Specification): Standards and technical specifications for the development of
aviation systems, software and hardware. RTCA DO-178C - Software Consid-
erations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification and RTCA DO-254 -
Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware; and their corre-
sponding supplement documents and considerations RTCA DO-330 - Software
Tool Qualification Considerations and RTCA DO-333 - Formal Methods Sup-
plement to DO-178C and DO-278A.
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• Methodology (RTCA DO-356A - Airworthiness Security Methods
and Considerations : Standards, technical specifications and guidance mate-
rial that describe/propose methodologies for security and safety. SAE ARP4754A
- Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems and SAE ARP4761
- Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on
Civil Airborne Systems Equipment are guidelines for safety for the development
of the aircraft. Whereas the ARINC documents are technical specifications for
industry; they are referenced in the RTCA standards in regards to technical
aspects.
• Maintenance (RTCA DO-355 - Information Security Guidance for
Continuing Airworthiness): Standards, guidelines and technical specifi-
cations that focus on ongoing service. SAE ARP 5150A - Safety Assessment
of Transport Airplanes in Commercial Service and SAE ARP 5151 - Safety
Assessment of General Aviation Aircraft and Rotorcraft in commercial use.
They are also classified in the following groups:
• Airworthiness Engineering: Engineering discipline that contains the processes
that ensure the aircraft’s suitability for safe flight.
• Airborne Equipment: Avionics.
• Design Assurance and Safety Engineering: Safety assurance for aviation sys-
tems.
• Information Security: Information Security frameworks that are not aviation
industry specific.
• North American Regulations: Regulations that play a substantial part in air-
worthiness security in North America (United States of American and Canada).
The RTCA DO-326A set guideline documents and standards are intended to be
used with other development assurance activities described in the previous chapter,
outlined in frameworks and standards such as SAE ARP 4754A, SAE ARP 4761,
RTCA DO-178C, and RTCA DO-254, in substantiation of compliance to the appli-
cable Code of Federal Regulations.
3.1.2 Means of Compliance
Acceptable means of compliance (AMC) target the uniform application and imple-
mentation of the regulation. The principal purpose of AMCs is to further qualify
material used for certification and demonstrate compliance with these requirements.
Although regulated entities are not bound by AMCs and may choose to demonstrate
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compliance through other means, AMCs provide a means to the presumption of com-
pliance.
In our case, Means of Compliance for Security Airworthiness would result in reg-
ulations referring to the Security Airworthiness standards RTCA DO-326A, DO-355,
DO-356A and providing evidence of complying with those standards.
• FAA AC 119-1: (2015) Airworthiness and Operational Authorization of Aircraft
Network Security Program (ANSP).
• FAA AC 20-140C: (2016) Guidelines for Design Approval of Aircraft Data Link
Communication Systems Supporting Air Traffic Services (ATS).
• FAA PS-Air-21.16-02 Rev. 2: (2017) Establishment of Special Conditions for
Aircraft Systems.
• FAA AC 120-76D: (2017) Authorization for Use of Electronic Flight Bags, New
Security Procedures.
In a way, Means of Compliance is a way to facilitate the certification task for both
the regulator and the entity. The adherence to those ensures recognition of compli-
ance with rules. If an applicant chooses to comply by other means, it must show that
it provides for compliance with the applicable specification or requirement. In these
cases, the burden of proof of compliance wholly rests with the applicant. This is why
most authorities and applicants try to adhere to the Means of Compliance of a set of
standards or regulations because proving compliance in any other way can result in
an arduous task.
3.2 Safety and Security Co-Engineering for Air-
worthiness
Safety and security are both risk-driven activities necessary to ensure airworthiness.
Even though historically they have been conceived as different engineering specialties,
it is obvious they cannot continue to ignore each other. As a matter of fact, current
research concludes that safety and security assessments can improve when they are
considered together or partially together.
The concurrent security and safety assurance processes are used as inputs to the
aircraft design and development process, and as a means for aircraft implementation
verification, and validation and certification processes.
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3.2.1 Safety Assessment Process and Security Assessment
Process
Just as failures and errors are treated as manageable risks to aircraft safety by the
airworthiness certification process, the threat of Unauthorized Interaction is treated
equally through the airworthiness security activities.
A framework that integrates the Security Assessment Process with the Safety Assess-
ment Process was proposed in the paper (Garcia et al., 2018).
Figure 3.3: Design and Development Framework
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The framework exploits the analogous nature of Safety and Security Engineering.
It follows the Safety Assessment Process explained in the previous chapter, as detailed
in (SAE-Aerospace, 1996). As methodologies, it uses:
• Fault Tree Analysis (FTA): uses Boolean logic gates to show the relationship of
failure effects to failure modes.
• Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA): A systematic, comprehensive examination
of functions to identify and classify Failure Conditions of those functions ac-
cording to their severity.
• Common Cause Analysis (CCA): support the development of the specific system
architecture and that of related systems by evaluating the overall. architecture
sensitivity to common cause events.
• Common Mode Analysis (CMA): is a qualitative analytical tool used to ensure
the “goodness” of a design.
• Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA): is a systematic, bottom-up method
of identifying the failure modes of a system, item, or function and determining
the effects on the next higher level.
• Failure Modes and Effects Summary (FMES): is a grouping of single failure
modes which produce the same failure effect.
The methodologies chosen for the Security Assessment (the threat modeling and
analysis) are STRIDE and DREAD, detailed in the previous chapter.
The difference presented between the Safety Assessment Process and the Security
Assessment Process is the resulting action after the requirements have been estab-
lished and the design and development has been done. The third of the security
engineering process establishes a critical point: there are cyber-threats and vulner-
abilities that are dormant to attack or unknown to the vendor until they are exploited.
The framework has to comply with the DO-326A set Means of Compliance and
be able to be integrated into the standards that allow for aircraft development. Oth-
erwise, it becomes an standalone framework, which is not optimal. Looking at Figure
3.2, it can be seen that if the Framework can adapt with industry standards SAE
ARP 4761 (ibid.) and SAE ARP 4754A (SAE-Aerospace, 2010), using their proposed
methodologies, it could comply with RTCA DO-326A set for development.
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3.2.2 SAE ARP 4754A
The aim of the framework is to allow Safety and Security co-engineering when it
comes to developing methodologies and frameworks for Airworthiness (both Safety
and Security). It is necessary to see if it can be integrated to the industry standards
frameworks:
Figure 3.4: ARP4754A Process - Interaction between safety and development pro-
cesses
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If the ARP4754A Process is modified, it can accommodate both Safety and Secu-
rity, Figure 3.5:
Figure 3.5: Modified ARP4754A Process - Interaction between safety, security and
development processes
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Once there is a clear vision of how Safety and the Development Process interact,
according to SAE ARP 4754A, the Safety Assessment Process has to be seen in more
detail, as in Figure 3.6.
Figure 3.6: ARP4754A Process - Safety Assessment Process Model (SAE-Aerospace,
2010)
In Figure 3.6, there is a representation of all the parameters and documents that
each step of the Safety Assessment Process and System Development Process needs.
PASA, PSSAs, SSAs and ASA are given inforamtion as input from the Development
Process and the CCAs, FHAs and FEMAs, and FTAs.
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3.2.3 SAE ARP 4761
In SAE ARP 4761 (SAE-Aerospace, 1996), the Safety Assessment Diagram is detailed
as follows:
Figure 3.7: ARP4761 Process - Safety Assessment Diagram
The needed parameters/variables and inputs needed to complete the path from
Requirements Identification to Verification are detailed in the diagram. It is also
indicated that some parameters from the Security Assessment, can be used for other
types of verification, for example, using the RTCA DO-178C set verification tools.
3.2.4 Integration of Safety / Security Methodologies.
The initial proposed framework is updated to add more security methodologies for
the Security Assessment Process. After researching different security methodologies
for designing, developing and implementing security with safety co-engineering, the
followin have been added:
• Attack Trees (AT). Attack Trees or Threat trees are similar to fault trees but
focus only on the security of a system and are an enumeration of possible attacks.
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The root of an attack tree represents a successful attack and the leaf nodes
represent ways of achieving the planned attack.
• Failure Mode, Vulnerabilities and Effects Analysis (FMVEA): is structured tech-
nique which investigates failure modes and their effects, as well as vulnerabili-
ties. It is split at the item level, so instead of being purely a Security Assessment
methodology, it gets input from the Safety Assessment as well.
Figure 3.8: Modified Design and Development Framework
The ARP4754A Process is modified once again, so it can accommodate both Safety
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Assessment and the new Security Assessment (same as Figure 3.5, but with the new
security methodologies):
Figure 3.9: Modified ARP4754A Process - Interaction between safety, security and
development processes
The detailed Safety Assessment Process in ARP4754A has been modified to ac-
commodate the Security Assessment Process too. Now the parameters and documents
needed for PASecA, PSSecA, SSecAs and ASecA are given from the Attack Trees,
the STIDE and DREAD Analysis, and the FMEAs of the Safety Engineering.
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Figure 3.10: Modified ARP4754A Process - Safety and Security Assessment Process
Model
In Figure 3.11, the needed parameters/variables and inputs needed to complete
the path from Requirements Identification to Verification are detailed in the new di-
agram. It is also indicated that some parameters from the Safety Assessment, such
as the ones needed to perform the FMVEAs, are given as input for the Security As-
sessment.
Since the FMVEA methodology is a split methodology one has to be very careful
not miss any parameter, or duplicate the work. If work were duplicated, for example,
the safety assessment team performed FMEAs and unbeknownst to the security as-
sessment team they performed FMVEAs in their totality, it could lead to duplicated
results and an increase on cost and wasted resources.
CHAPTER 3. DISCUSSION 36
Figure 3.11: Modified ARP4761 Process - Safety and Security Assessment Diagram
The Design and Development Framework in this process leaves to a constant state
of updating CI STRIDE that is not factored in. Therefore, a continuous security
assessment model integrated into the security assessment model (which had, in its
turn, been integrated into the safety assessment model) was proposed to be able
to contemplate this possibility. The CI STRIDE is updated and forwarded to the
verification stage, where it is monitored to see if there are any new vulnerabilities
that might affect the configuration item.
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Chapter 4
Conclusions and Future Research
4.1 Conclusions
This thesis premise was the study of the intricacies of building and designing an infor-
mation security framework for aviation systems. It had to comply with the most rel-
evant Airworthiness Security standards (the RTCA DO-326A set), meet their means
of compliance, and be able to be integrated into the most used technical documents
and standards for aircraft systems development and certification.
To be able to ensure an understanding of the certification and standardization
process of a technical document, guidance or standard for the proposed framework (in
a hypothetical case), an in-depth study of the regulatory process of aircraft regulations
and aviation law has been done.
The study of the state-of-the-art techniques and methodologies to do the secu-
rity assessment of the framework while also taking advantage of the safety assess-
ment methods already established (to prove the validity of security and safety co-
engineering in aircraft development) have been studied.
Furthermore, two frameworks have been proposed in the discussion carried out in
this thesis, given a broad overview of the different approaches for Security Assessment
and Safety Assessment.
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4.2 Future Research
There is always future research in an emerging topic as cybersecurity in aviation.
Aircraft are becoming more complex and sophisticated as they have ever been, and
that includes taking advantage of all the new technology that is constantly being
developed. As future research topics, this thesis proposes:
• An extrapolation of the ‘Hazard Space Analysis’ of Safety Engineering and
Safety Assessment applied to the ’Threat Space Analysis’ of Security Engineer-
ing and Security Assessment (Aceituna, 2017).
• An implementation of SAHARA: STRIDE approach and HARA (Hazard Anal-
ysis and Risk Assessment). (Macher et al., 2015) The process quantifies the
security impact on dependable safety-related system development at system
level. The inductive analysis methods HARA and SAHARA to also enable
the quantification of additional dependability features (such as reliability and
availability).
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